### Recitation 3: Consumer Theory and Food Stamps

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### **Outline For Recitation**

- 1. Review of Income and and Substitution effects and demand curves
- 2. Example Problem: In-Kind Transfers
  - Simple Problem: Choosing food expenditure subject to budget constraint.
  - Policy 1: A tax credit for each unit of food
  - Policy 2: Food Stamps

## Review of Income and Substitution Effects and Demand Curves



DECOMPOSITION OF PRICE EFFECT INTO INCOME AND SUBSTITUTION EFFECTS



#### Example Problem - Setup

- **2** "goods": Food (F) and all other spending (G)
- Income: \$90
- Price of Food = \$1 per unit
- Price of all of goods: \$2 per unit
- Consumer preferences are Cobb-Douglas and given by:

$$U(F,G)=F^{\frac{1}{3}}G^{\frac{2}{3}}$$

How much F and G will the agent consume?

# Primal Problem: Choosing *F* and *G* to maximize utility, subject to Budget Constraint

Budget Constraint:  $P_GG + P_FF = I$  or F + 2G = 90.

Lagrangian is:

$$L = F^{\frac{1}{3}}G^{\frac{2}{3}} + \lambda(I - P_FF - P_GG)$$

Handy Trick - apply monotone transformation (i.e. take logs).
3 first order conditions (with respect to *F*, *G* and λ)

$$\frac{\partial L}{\partial F} = \frac{1}{3F} - P_F \lambda = 0$$
$$\frac{\partial L}{\partial G} = \frac{2}{3G} - P_G \lambda = 0$$
$$\frac{\partial L}{\partial \lambda} = I - P_F F - P_G G = 0$$
$$\rightarrow F^* = \frac{I}{3P_F} = 30 \qquad G^* = \frac{2I}{3P_G} = 30$$

These are the Marshallian demands

#### Indirect Utility and the "Dual" Problem

Indirect Utility: Utility consumer can attain given a budget and prices

$$U(F^*, G^*) = \left(\frac{90}{3}\right)^{\frac{1}{3}} \left(\frac{90}{3}\right)^{\frac{2}{3}} = 30$$

The dual is to minimize expenditure in order to attain a given utility level

$$L = P_F F + P_G G + \lambda \left( 30 - F^{\frac{1}{3}} G^{\frac{2}{3}} \right)$$

**3** first order conditions (with respect to F, G and  $\lambda$ )

$$\frac{\partial L}{\partial F} = P_F - \frac{\lambda}{3F} = 0 \rightarrow \lambda = 3FP_F$$
$$\frac{\partial L}{\partial G} = P_G - \frac{2\lambda}{3G} = 0 \rightarrow \lambda = \frac{3GP_G}{2} \rightarrow F = \frac{GP_G}{2P_F}$$
$$\frac{\partial L}{\partial \lambda} = 30 - F^{\frac{1}{3}}G^{\frac{2}{3}} = 0$$
$$\rightarrow F_h^* = 30 \left(\frac{P_G}{2P_F}\right)^{\frac{2}{3}} = 30 \qquad G_h^* = 30 \left(\frac{2P_F}{P_G}\right)^{\frac{1}{3}} = 30$$

### Policy 1: Tax subsidy for Food Spending

- A subsidy of 0.50 for each dollar spent on food for these households.
- Budget constraint becomes:

$$1 - \frac{1}{2}$$
 F + 2G = 90

Two questions:

- 1. What are they going to consume now?
  - What change comes from the substitution effect?
  - What change comes from the income effect?
- 2. What lump sum of income could we have given them such that they are indifferent between the lump sum and this subsidy?

## Primal Problem: What are they going to consume now?

Lagrangian is:

$$L = F^{\frac{1}{3}}G^{\frac{2}{3}} + \lambda \quad 90 - \frac{1}{2}F - 2G$$

FOCs are:

$$\frac{\partial L}{\partial F} = \frac{1}{3F} - \frac{1}{2}\lambda = 0$$
$$\frac{\partial L}{\partial G} = \frac{2}{3G} - 2\lambda = 0$$
$$\frac{\partial L}{\partial \lambda} = 90 - \frac{1}{2}F - 2G = 0$$
$$\rightarrow F_{\tau}^* = 60 \qquad G_{\tau}^* = 30$$

# Primal Problem: What part of this change comes from the substitution effect?

- Note that we just moved along the Marshallian (uncompensated) demand curve above.
- The substitution effect comes from moving along the Hicksian (compensated) demand curve.

$$F_{\tau,\text{SE only}}^* = 30 \quad \frac{P_G}{2P_F} \quad \frac{2}{3} = 47.6$$
$$G_{\tau,\text{SE only}}^* = 30 \quad \frac{2P_F}{P_G} \quad \frac{1}{3} = 23.8$$

The different between the two answers is the income effect! It increase your consumption of both.

# Dual Problem: What lump-sum transfer could we give them so that they are indifferent?

What utility level do they achieve with the tax subsidy?

$$U(F_{\tau}^*, G_{\tau}^*) = 60^{\frac{1}{3}} \times 30^{\frac{2}{3}} \approx 37.8$$

So, now we want to find the income they would need to get this utility at the pre-subsidy prices. We can do this using the indirect utility function:

$$U(1,2,I) = \frac{I_{\text{lump sum}}}{3} \quad \frac{1}{3} \quad \frac{I_{\text{lump sum}}}{3} \quad \frac{2}{3} = 37.8$$
$$\rightarrow I_{\text{lump sum}} = 113.4$$

■ Therefore, they need 113.4 - 90 = \$23.4 to make them indifferent.

With the subsidy, the government paid 0.50 \* 60 = 30 > 23.4!

#### Why is the lump-sum transfer cheaper?

Why do you have to give them less? Because they have diminishing MRS!

$$F_{\text{lump sum}}^* = \frac{113.4}{3} = 37.8$$
  
 $G_{\text{lump sum}}^* = \frac{113.4}{3} = 37.8$ 

### Policy 2: Food Stamps

- What does the budget constraint look like with food stamps?
- Who is indifferent between food stamps and a lump-sum transfer?
- Who prefers a lump sum transfer to food stamps?
- Who prefers food stamps to a lump sum transfer?
- What would the budget set look like if you could sell food stamps on the black market for half their value?

14.03 / 14.003 Microeconomic Theory and Public Policy  $\ensuremath{\mathsf{Fall}}$  2016

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