

Systems Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA)

STPA

(System-Theoretic Process Analysis)




- Identify accidents and hazards
- Draw the control structure
- Step 1: Identify unsafe control actions
- Step 2: Identify causal factors and create scenarios



STPA (System-Theoretic Process Analysis)



- Identify accidents and hazards
- Draw the control structure
- Step 1: Identify unsafe control actions
- Step 2: Identify causal factors and create scenarios




STPA (System-Theoretic Process Analysis)




 Identify accidents and hazards



 Draw the control structure



- Step 1: Identify unsafe control actions
- Step 2: Identify causal factors and create scenarios




ITP Exercise


a new in-trail procedure for trans-oceanic flights

STPA

(System-Theoretic Process Analysis)



- Identify accidents and hazards
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- Step 2: Identify causal factors and create scenarios



Example System: Aviation

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System-level Accident (Loss): ?

Example System: Aviation

Image removed due to copyright restrictions.

System-level Accident (Loss): Two aircraft collide

Image removed due to copyright restrictions.

System-level Accident (Loss): Two aircraft collide System-level Hazard: ?

Hazard

- Definition: A system state or set of conditions that, together with a particular set of worst-case environmental conditions, will lead to an accident (loss).
- Something we can <u>control</u>
- Examples:

Accident	Hazard
Satellite becomes lost or unrecoverable	Satellite maneuvers out of orbit
People die from exposure to toxic chemicals	Toxic chemicals are released into the atmosphere
People die from radiation sickness	Nuclear power plant releases radioactive materials
People die from food poisoning	Food products containing pathogens are sold

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System-level Accident (Loss): Two aircraft collide System-level Hazard: Two aircraft violate minimum separation


Aviation Examples

- System-level Accident (loss)
 - Two aircraft collide
 - Aircraft crashes into terrain / ocean
- System-level Hazards
 - Two aircraft violate minimum separation
 - Aircraft enters unsafe atmospheric region
 - Aircraft enters uncontrolled state
 - Aircraft enters unsafe attitude
 - Aircraft enters prohibited area


Aviation Examples

- System-level Accident (loss)
 - A-1: Two aircraft collide
 - A-2: Aircraft crashes into terrain / ocean
- System-level Hazards
 - H-1: Two aircraft violate minimum separation
 - H-2: Aircraft enters unsafe atmospheric region
 - H-3: Aircraft enters uncontrolled state
 - H-4: Aircraft enters unsafe attitude
 - H-5: Aircraft enters prohibited area


STPA (System-Theoretic Process Analysis)



- Identify accidents and hazards
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
North Atlantic Tracks



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
STPA application: NextGen In-Trail Procedure (ITP)

Current State




- Pilots will have separation information
- Pilots decide when to request a passing maneuver
- Air Traffic Control approves/denies request


Proposed Change




- High-level (simple) Control Structure
 - Main components and controllers?




- High-level (simple) Control Structure
 - Who controls who?




- High-level (simple)
 Control Structure
 - What commands are sent?




High-level (simple)
 Control Structure




 More complex control structure




Example High-level control structure






STPA (System-Theoretic Process Analysis)

- Identify accidents and hazards
- Draw the control structure
- Step 1: Identify unsafe control actions
- Step 2: Identify causal factors and create scenarios




Identify Unsafe Control Actions




Flight Crew	Not providing	Providing	Incorrect Timing/	Stopped Too
Action (Role)	causes hazard	Causes hazard	Order	Soon
		Pilots perform		
Execute Passing Maneuver		ITP when ITP		
		criteria are not		
		met or request		
		has been refused		
		[H-1]		

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Structure of a Hazardous Control Action





Four parts of a hazardous control action


- Source Controller: the controller that can provide the control action
- Type: whether the control action was provided or not provided
- Control Action: the controller's command that was provided / missing
- Context: conditions for the hazard to occur
 - (system or environmental state in which command is provided)


Defining Safety Constraints

Unsafe Control Action	Safety Constraint
Pilot performs ITP when ITP criteria are not met or request has been refused	Pilot must not perform ITP when criteria are not met or request has been refused
Pilot starts maneuver late after having re-verified ITP criteria	Pilot must start maneuver within X minutes of re-verifying ITP criteria
Etc.	Etc.


STPA (System-Theoretic Process Analysis)

- Identify accidents and hazards
- Draw the control structure
- Step 1: Identify unsafe control actions





STPA Step 2: Causal scenarios



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